Screening When Some Agents are Non-Strategic: Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude? (Technical Supplement)

Raymond Deneckere and Sergei Severinov

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: Technical supplement to the paper forthcoming in Rand Journal of Economics.

Keywords: mechanism design; screening; honesty; bounded rationality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2005-12-26, Revised 2005-12-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:severinov-05-12-26-01-26-15

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