Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes and complements

Dermot Leahy and J. Peter Neary

No 200417, Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: We introduce the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all member firms. We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions already derived in the literature. Finally we explore the implications of our results for the comparison between research joint ventures and a non-cooperative equilibrium.

Keywords: Bertrand and Cournot competition; Cooperative substitutes and comp; R&D; Research joint ventures; Strategic trade and industrial policy; Competition; Joint ventures; Industrial policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1789 First version, 2004 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Symmetric research joint ventures: Cooperative substitutes and complements (2005)
Working Paper: Symmetrical Research Joint Ventures: Cooperative Substitutes and Complements (2004)
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