Designing Scientific Grants

Christoph Carnehl, Marco Ottaviani and Justus Preusser

Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy, 2025, vol. 4, issue 1, 139 - 178

Abstract: This paper offers an overview of the economics of scientific grants, focusing on the interplay between the inherent uncertainty in research, researchers’ incentives, and grant design. Grants differ from traditional market systems and other science and innovation policy tools, such as prizes and patents. We outline the main economic forces specific to science, noting the limited attention given to grant funding in the economics literature. Using tools from information economics, we identify key incentive problems at various stages of the grant funding process and offer guidance for effective grant design.

Date: 2025
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