The Selective Enforcement of Government Regulations: Battleground States, State Regulators, and the Environmental Protection Agency

Huseyin Gulen and Brett W. Myers

Journal of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 67, issue 1, 225 - 263

Abstract: The Electoral College creates incentives for politicians and regulators to direct policy favors toward battleground or swing states. We examine whether this affects regulatory enforcement and find that facilities in battleground states are less likely to be found in violation of the Clean Water Act, partially because the permit limits for facilities in these states are less restrictive. Identification is obtained by analyzing violation rates of similar facilities located along the border between battleground and nonbattleground states.

Date: 2024
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