A Study of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and the State of California

Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi and Daichi Shimamoto

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2026, vol. 4, issue 3, 848 - 869

Abstract: We apply an approach based on regression discontinuity previously developed to screen for collusion to public procurement data from five countries. We find that bidders who win by a very small margin have significantly lower backlog than those who lose by a very small margin in the sample of procurement auctions from Indonesia, suggesting that bidders collude by bid rotation. Our results suggest that the proportion of noncompetitive auctions is at least about 7% for all electronic procurement auctions and about 3% for all auctions in Indonesia. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of competition in other countries.

Date: 2026
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Working Paper: A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California (2022)
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