An Experimental Evaluation of Notification Strategies to Increase Property Tax Compliance: Free-Riding in the City of Brotherly Love

Michael Chirico, Robert P. Inman, Charles Loeffler, John MacDonald and Holger Sieg

Tax Policy and the Economy, 2016, vol. 30, issue 1, 129 - 161

Abstract: This study evaluates a set of notification strategies intended to increase property tax collection. To test these strategies, we develop a field experiment in collaboration with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue. The resulting notification strategies draw on core rationales for tax compliance: deterrence, the need to finance the provision of public goods and services, as well as an appeal to civic duty. Our empirical findings provide evidence that carefully designed and targeted notification strategies can modestly improve tax compliance.

Date: 2016
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