A Model of Endogenous Union Density and Membership

Habib Ahmed and Stephen Miller
Additional contact information
Habib Ahmed: Islamic Development Bank
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Habib Ahmed () and Ahmed Mohamed Habib ()

No 1999-01, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a theoretical model of endogenously determined union density and union membership. A union is formed, continued, or dissolved by majority voting. Given the profitability, production technology, and labor and product market conditions, the union determines the reservation wage that is acceptable to the firm. Based on this reservation wage and other subjective factors, workers vote for or against the union. If the union is formed, the firm determines the employment level at the union wage.

Keywords: unions; bargaining; median voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1999-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/1999-01.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:1999-01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics University of Connecticut 365 Fairfield Way, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark McConnel ().