Retail Agglomeration and Competition Externalities: Evidence from Openings and Closings of Multiline Department Stores in the US

John Clapp (), Stephen Ross and Tingyu Zhou

No 2015-04, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: From the perspective of an existing retailer, the optimal size of a cluster of retail activity represents a trade-off between the marginal increases in consumer attraction from another store against the depletion of the customer base caused by an additional competitor. We estimate opening and closing probabilities of multi-line department stores (“anchors”) as a function of pre-existing anchors by type of anchor store (low-priced, mid-priced or high-priced) using a bias corrected probit model with county and year fixed effects. We find strong negative competitive effects of an additional same type but no effect on openings of anchors of another type.

Keywords: Multi-line Department Stores; Shopping Centers; Openings; Closings; Bias-Corrected Probit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L1 L21 L81 R1 R12 R3 R33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-geo, nep-ind and nep-ure
Note: Stephen Ross is the corresponding author
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Related works:
Journal Article: Retail Agglomeration and Competition Externalities: Evidence from Openings and Closings of Multiline Department Stores in the U.S (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2015-04

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