UK Merger Remedies under Scrutiny

Michael Harker
Additional contact information
Michael Harker: Centre for Competition Policy and Norwich Law School, University of East Anglia

No 2006-16, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This paper focuses on the Somerfield decision of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). In that decision, the CAT demonstrated a high degree of deference to the Competition Commission where the latter was scoping divestiture remedies in a merger case. This approach is consistent with the case law of the US and EC and, it is argued, is appropriate given the need for procedural expediency. The decision is placed in the wider context of the debates over the efficacy of merger remedies and the appropriate limits of judicial supervision of agency discretion in this area.

Keywords: Merger Remedies; Divestiture; Merger Appraisal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/ccp/CCP-06-16.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2006_16

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Juliette Hardman, Center for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Juliette Hardmad ().