Inconsistent Regulation, Market Structure and Broadband Adoption in the EU: a Dynamic Model

Richard Cadman
Additional contact information
Richard Cadman: Centre for Competition Policy and Strategy and Policy Consultants Network Ltd

No 2008-14, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: The New Regulatory Framework (NRF) for electronic communications was intended to usher in an era of harmonised regulation across the European Union leading to better choice, price and quality for European consumers. The European Commission has voiced its frustration at the fragmented nature of the implementation of the NRF. In this paper I examine whether the NRF has indeed been introduced in a fragmented manner and whether that fragmentation affects consumers, taking broadband penetration, which is regarded as desirable both socially and economically, as the measure of consumer outcome. I find that a causal relationship exists between public policy, prices of unbundled local loops, market concentration and adoption of broadband. Using a Lagged Dependent Variable model, I find that decreasing concentration in the market structure of broadband access technologies at retail level has a strong effect on the take-up of broadband, with the effect taking time to be fully realised. To enhance consumer adoption of broadband, therefore, policy makers in the EU should seek to improve the opportunity for broadband competition.

Keywords: broadband adoption; regulation; electronic communications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L86 L88 L96 L98 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/ccp/CCP-08-14.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2008_14

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Juliette Hardman, Center for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Juliette Hardmad ().