Collusion in Industrial Economics and Optimally Designed Leniency Programmes - A Survey

Panayiotis Agisilaou
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Panayiotis Agisilaou: Centre for Competition Policy and School of Economics, University of East Anglia

No 2013-03, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This paper provides a critical and systematic overview of the most influential contributions to the economics literature on collusion and leniency programmes in antitrust. It also reviews the literature on the economics of (generic) law enforcement, with a focus on self-reporting schemes, for crimes committed either by individuals or groups of individuals. The principal objective of the survey is to enhance our understanding of how leniency policies impact on cartel formation and sustainability.

Keywords: collusion; leniency programmes; optimal enforcement; cartel deterrence; antitrust policy; self-reporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2013_03

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