Signing as Signalling in International Environmental Agreements

Antonina Nazarova, Corrado Di Maria and Emiliya Lazarova
Additional contact information
Antonina Nazarova: University of East Anglia

No 2024-03, University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: In this paper, we revisit the role of the signature by the executive in the context of international environmental agreements. Using a novel panel dataset covering 52 agreements involving 203 countries over the period 1975-2017, we show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the act of signing a treaty significantly increases the probability of ratification.

Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; Strategic Interaction; Signalling; Signature; Proportional Hazard Models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 K33 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/ueaeco/UEA-ECO-2024-03.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2024-03

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Reception, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cara Liggins ().