Political pressure deflection

JamesE. Anderson and Maurizio Zanardi

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes-political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to 'sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution. © 2009 The Author(s).

Keywords: Pressure deflection; Elections; Antidumping; D72; F13; H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in: Public choice (2009) v.141,p.129-150

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Political pressure deflection (2009)
Working Paper: Political Pressure Deflection (2004)
Working Paper: Political Pressure Deflection (2004)
Working Paper: Political Pressure Deflection (2004)
Working Paper: Political Pressure Deflection (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/136351

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... lb.ac.be:2013/136351

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().