Shareholders' control in complex corporate structures
Marc Levy ()
ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
Abstract:
In this global world, many firms present a complex shareholding structure with
indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers.
Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between
them. Determining who has the most influence is often a difficult task. To measure this
influence, game theory allows the modeling of voting games and the computing of the
Banzhaf index. This thesis develops models to measure the Banzhaf indices in any ownership structure (pyramidal ownership structures and cross-ownership structures). The models are then applied to real cases studies such Colruyt, Elia, Lafarge and Allianz.
Keywords: Stockholders; Business enterprises -- Mathematical models; Actionnaires; Entreprises -- Modèles mathématiques; Control; Ownership structure; Banzhaf index; Cross-Ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 1 v. (179 p.)
Date: 2012-01-13
Note: Degree: Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/209768
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