The timing of education

Thomas Gall, Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We study an assignment-with-investment model to highlight a tradeoff between investment in human capital before (ex ante system) and after (ex post system) matching on the labor market. The ex post system is better at coordinating investment within firms whereas the ex ante system is better at reducing mismatches. We further show that the ability to transfer surplus within firms affects mismatches and the relative performance of the two systems. At high degrees of transferability, they are equivalent. But when transferability is very low, the ex post system outperforms the ex ante system, although with moderate transferability the reverse is true. © 2006 by the European Economic Association.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in: European Economic Association. Journal (2006) v.4 n° 2-3,p.427-435

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: The timing of education (2008)
Journal Article: The Timing of Education (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/7026

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... .ulb.ac.be:2013/7026

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().