Corporate governance, competition policy and industrial policy

Mathias Dewatripont, Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This paper shows that introducing agency considerations into a model of innovations and growth can have radical consequences as to the effects of competition policy and industrial policy on the rate of technological change. Whilst competition policy (resp. industrial policy) has a negative (resp. a positive) effect on growth in a Schumpeterian model with profit-maximising firms, these effects are shown to be both reversed when agency problems within innovating firms become sufficiently important. © 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.

Keywords: Agency problems; Competition policy; Industrial policy; Innovations; Product market competition; Slack (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (101)

Published in: European Economic Review (1997) v.41 n° 3-5,p.797-805

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