Tax morale, public goods, and politics: Experimental evidence from Mozambique

Wayne Aaron Sandholtz and Pedro C. Vicente

Nova SBE Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract: Tax revenue is vital for development, but governments must balance raising revenues with maintaining political support. Partnering with a city government in Mozambique, we experimentally vary the provision of information highlighting the role of municipal tax revenues in 1) local public good provision and 2) local political autonomy. We measure how this information affects property owners’ tax morale and political support for the government. Public goods information raises tax morale, especially in areas of low baseline public good provision, but has no effect on voting. The political message increases electoral support generally, but raises tax morale only among co-partisans. These results suggest that communication about the uses of public revenue offers a politically feasible way to increase tax morale.

Keywords: Tax morale; Public goods; Information; Political economy; Experiments; Mozambique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 H00 O12 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp671

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