Population monotonicity and egalitarianism

Bas Dietzenbacher and Emre Dogan
Additional contact information
Bas Dietzenbacher: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 7, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which population monotonicity (no player is worse off when additional players enter the game) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible, which is the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme. On this domain, which strictly includes the class of convex games, population monotonicity and egalitarian core selection together characterize the Dutta-Ray solution. We relate the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme to several other classes of games.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/194209657/RM24007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2024007

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2024007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().