Envy-free reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

Pauline Hanssen and Bas Dietzenbacher
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Pauline Hanssen: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Bas Dietzenbacher: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 7, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: This paper studies reallocation problems where preferences are single-dipped and each agent is endowed with a share of one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity. We focus on several envy-freeness requirements: standard envy-freeness, restricted envy-freeness, net trade envy-freeness, and proportional envy-freeness. It turns out that none of these envy freeness requirements is compatible with Pareto optimality for each reallocation problem. However, for standard envy-freeness, net trade envy-freeness, and proportional envy-freeness, at most one allocation is Pareto optimal. For restricted envy-freeness, at most one allocation is Pareto optimal and individually rational. For each of the four envy-freeness requirements, we characterize this unique allocation for each reallocation problem where it exists.

Keywords: resource reallocation; single-dipped preferences; Envy-freeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2026007

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2026007

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