Manager to go? Performance dips reconsidered with evidence from Dutch football

Allard Bruinshoofd () and Bas ter Weel

No 18, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT)

Abstract: This paper examines whether the forced resignation of managers of Dutch football teams leads to an improvement in the results. We find by analysing 12 years of football in the highest Dutch league that forced resignations are preceded by declines in team performance and followed by improvements in performance. However, the improvement in performance after appointing a new manager does not exceed the seasonal average of both the old and new manager. More importantly, using a control group, it turns out that when the manager would not have been forced to resign, performance would have improved more rapidly. We conclude from this that sacking a manager seems to be neither effective nor efficient in terms of improving team performance.

Keywords: economics of technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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