Corruption as a Gendered Barrier: Informal Institutions and the Limits of Democratization in North Macedonia

Milka Muratovska, Ina Kubbe and Ortrun Merkle
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Ortrun Merkle: RS: GSBE MORSE, RS: GSBE MGSoG, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance

No 2025-020, MERIT Working Papers from United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT)

Abstract: This article examines how corruption operates as a gendered informal institution that restricts women’s substantive political empowerment in post-socialist democracies. Focusing on North Macedonia, we argue that clientelism and male-dominated party networks function as gatekeeping mechanisms that limit women’s access to decision-making despite the presence of gender quotas. Drawing on a sequential mixed-methods study—including an online survey and in-depth interviews with women politicians—we show how informal party practices, electoral manipulation, and the co-optation of quotas create symbolic rather than substantive inclusion. By reframing corruption as a structural and gendered mechanism of exclusion, this study explains why formal democratization and numerical representation fail to dismantle entrenched patriarchal networks. These findings underscore the need for anti-corruption and democratization reforms that confront informal institutions, offering insights for other transitional and hybrid regimes where gendered exclusion persists beneath democratic façades.

JEL-codes: D73 J16 P20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09-30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:unumer:2025020

DOI: 10.53330/EIYG4072

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