Institutional Analysis of Property Rights: Means of Individualization (Trademark) as an Institutional Alternative in Ensuring Quality and Specific Performance

Ivan Shulga (), Aleksander Eliseev () and Tatyana Kuznetsova
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Ivan Shulga: Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University
Aleksander Eliseev: Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University

No 13, Working Papers from Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics

Abstract: The paper provides analysis of means of individualization (trademarks) as an institutional alternative to ensure quality of market goods and to enforce specific contractual performance of sellers and buyers. In general, the price mechanism as described in the perfect competition paradigm fails to ensure efficient market exchange of sophisticated goods and supplementary institutions such as a reputational mechanism are often required. Means of individualization as part of the reputational mechanism contribute to increasing efficiency of the market exchange by ensuring quality of market goods and, in broader context, by enforcing specific performance within the market contracts. The paper provides analysis of advantages and disadvantages of the means of individualization as compared with its institutional alternatives - “pure” market institutions, and centralized regulation of quality/contract performance

Keywords: trademark; means of individualization; brand; institutional alternatives; transaction costs; intellectual property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 D86 H23 K11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2014-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upa:wpaper:0013

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