The economic basis of liability in criminal law enforcement: liability based on the damage caused Vs. liability based on the proceeds of the offense

Gregory Kalyagin () and Alena Gorbuntsova ()
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Gregory Kalyagin: Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University
Alena Gorbuntsova: New Economic School

No 56, Working Papers from Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics

Abstract: This work, using computer simulation methods, answers the following question: which is more effective, from the point of view of public welfare, linking the severity of punishment for a crime to the public damage from it, or to the income that the criminal received? The answer, in the end, turns out to be twofold: on the one hand, linking the severity of punishment to the criminal's income from the offense contributes to the maximum deterrence of crimes; on the other hand, public welfare reaches its maximum value when the severity of punishment is tied to public damage from the crime and not to the income that the criminal receives from him.

Keywords: severity of punishment; damage from an offense; proceeds of crime; deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upa:wpaper:0056

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