Corruption and renegotiation in procurement

Leandro Arozamena, Juan José Ganuza () and Federico Weinschelbaum
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Juan José Ganuza: https://www.upf.edu/web/econ/faculty/-/asset_publisher/6aWmmXf28uXT/persona/id/3418872

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: A sponsor –e.g. a government agency– uses a procurement auction to select a supplier who will be in charge of the execution of a contract. That contract is incomplete: it may be renegotiated once the auction's winner has been chosen. We examine a setting where one firm may bribe the agent in charge of monitoring contract execution so that the former is treated preferentially if renegotiation actually occurs. If a bribe is accepted, the corrupt firm will be more aggressive at the initial auction and thus win with a larger probability. We show that the equilibrium probability of corruption is larger when the initial contract is less complete, when the corrupt firm's cost is more likely to be similar to her rivals', and when it faces fewer competitors.

Keywords: Auctions; procurement; corruption; renegotiation; cost overruns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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