A theory of front-line management

Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug ()
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Alexander Frug: https://www.upf.edu/web/econ/faculty/-/asset_publisher/6aWmmXf28uXT/persona/id/3421088

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: Mid- and low-level managers play a significant role within the organizational hierarchy, far beyond monitoring. It is often their responsibility to respond to opportunities and threats within their units by adjusting their subordinates’ assignments. Most such managers, however, lack the authority to adapt their subordinates’ wages. In- stead, they rely on other, more restrictive incentive schemes. We study the interaction between a front-line manager and worker, and characterize the “managerial style” as a function of the players’ relative patience and information.

Keywords: front-line management; perishable incentives; asymmetric discounting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-mac and nep-mic
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