On the impossibility of stability-based equilibria in infinite horizon: An example

Alexander Frug () and Malachy James Gavan
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Alexander Frug: https://www.upf.edu/web/econ/faculty/-/asset_publisher/6aWmmXf28uXT/persona/id/3421088

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: This paper shows that stability-based equilibrium refinements may not be well defined when taken to the infinite horizon. To do so, we use a stable-set-style notion of the dynamically consistent partition, allowing for incomplete information. We provide a concrete example where, only via taking the game to the infinite horizon, the dynamically consistent partition of equilibria does not exist.

Keywords: dynamic learning and communication; revision-proof equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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