Global Coalitional Games

Giovanni Rossi ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: Global coalitional games are TU cooperative games intended to model situations where the worth of coalitions varies across different partitions of the players. Formally, they are real-valued functions whose domain is the direct product of the subset lattice and the lattice of partitions of a finite player set. Therefore, the dimension of the associated vector space grows dramatically fast with the cardinality of the player set, inducing flexibility as well as complexity. Accordingly, some reasonable restrictions that reduce such a dimension are considered. The solution concepts associated with the Shapley value and the core are studied for the general (i.e., unrestricted) case.

Keywords: lattice; lattice function; coalition; partition; Shapley value; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:415

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