A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires

Stefano Vannucci ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible (strong) weight-profiles as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of a neo-parliamentary or mixed semi-presidential government form provided that the majority formation rule is collegial.

JEL-codes: D71 O25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:437

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