Prices, Quantities, and Correlated Externalities

Arthur Caplan

No 2003-08, Working Papers from Utah State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides an answer to the question, are emission taxes an efficient and self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems? By “correlated externality” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which cause differentiated regional and global externalities. By “self-enforcing” we mean mechanisms that account for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that, unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets, joint emissions taxes are neither efficient nor self-enforcing.

JEL-codes: C72 D62 D78 H41 H77 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2003-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.bus.usu.edu/RePEc/usu/pdf/ERI2003-08.pdf First version, 2003 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usu:wpaper:2003-08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Utah State University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John Gilbert ().