The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations

M. Perry and Daniel Vincent
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M. Perry: University of Western Ontario, https://economics.uwo.ca/

No 9614, University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series from University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics

Abstract: We illustrate by means of a dynamic research and development race that, while at some points in the race, social incentives and private incentives may coincide, at other points they may diverge too many researchers remain that race.

Keywords: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; SOCIAL CHOICE; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations (2002)
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