Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis

Simon Anderson and Stephen Coate

Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a theory of the market provision of broadcasting and uses it to address the nature of market failure in the industry. Advertising levels may be too low or too high, depending on the nuisance cost to viewers, the substitutability of programs, and the expected benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers. Market provision may allocate too few or too many resources to programming and these resources may be used to produce programs of the wrong type. Monopoly ownership may produce higher social surplus than competitive ownership and the ability to price programming may reduce social surplus.

Keywords: public goods; broadcasting; advertising; market failure; two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2003-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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http://repec.as.virginia.edu/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap358.pdf (application/pdf)
http://repec.as.virginia.edu/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap358f.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vir:virpap:358

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