Expectations, cores, and strategy-proofness under externalities

Maria Haydee Fonseca-Mairena () and Matteo Triossi
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Maria Haydee Fonseca-Mairena: Department of Economics and Management, Catholic University of the Maule Region, Talca, Chile

No 8, Working Papers from Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Abstract: We study the connection between cores and strategy-proofness in environments with externalities. With this objective in mind, we present a new concept of the core that relies on agents' expectations about their peers' reactions to group deviations. It encompasses several core consistent solutions previously proposed in the literature for environments with externalities. It allows us to prove that essentially single-valued cores are necessary and sufficient for strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational mechanisms.

Keywords: Allocation problems; Core; Expectations; Externalities; Strategy-proofness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 D62 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2024-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vnm:wpdman:217

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