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Fiscal Constraints In The European Union – When More Is Less?

Macsim Florin-Alexandru () and Oprea Florin ()
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Oprea Florin: Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Iasi, Romania;

Scientific Annals of Economics and Business, 2015, vol. 62, issue s1, 19-28

Abstract: This paper examines the implications of fiscal rules measured through the Fiscal Rules Index and fiscal institutions that supervise fiscal policies on key aspects of fiscal policies such as public debt and budget deficits. Our goal was to identify the specific links between fiscal rules, institutions and fiscal policies, to support any rethinking of public policy matters. Our results confirm that the government’s consolidated debt is influenced by both fiscal rules and institutions. Through this research we have showed that an increased number of institutions and fiscal rules is closely related to an increase in public debt levels. We explained this influence by stating that cause may consist in not having one strong and independent institution, but more institutions more or less independent that divide key responsibilities. Also our results indicate that budget deficits aren’t influenced either by supervising institutions or fiscal rules.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:aicuec:v:62:y:2015:i:s1:p:19-28:n:3

DOI: 10.1515/aicue-2015-0033

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