Why does cooperation work or fail? The case of EU-US sanction policy against Iran
Matera Paulina () and
Matera Rafał ()
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Matera Paulina: University of Lodz, Faculty of International and Political Studies
Matera Rafał: University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology
Croatian International Relations Review, 2019, vol. 25, issue 85, 30-62
Abstract:
In the article, we explore the factors which brought about the transatlantic coordination of the policy of imposing sanctions on Iran. We will mainly focus on the events in the 21st century when the new incentives for cooperation appeared due to the growing concern over the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Considering the capabilities of using the tools of economic statecraft and diplomacy, we claim that the EU-US cooperation can be termed a co-leadership. The assessment and the reasons for the transatlantic break-up on this matter during the presidency of Donald Trump was examined using the concept of relative gains. We evaluate to what extent the initial goals were achieved in practice, and we also try to predict the possible consequences of the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Keywords: Cooperation of the allies; relative gains; co-leadership; sanctions against Iran; the JCPOA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:cinrer:v:25:y:2019:i:85:p:30-62:n:2
DOI: 10.2478/cirr-2019-0005
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