Dismissal through disability

Wolter Hassink, Jan van Ours and Geert Ridder
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Wolter Hassink: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie (Free University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics Sciences, Business Administration and Economitrics

No 36, Serie Research Memoranda from VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics

Abstract: If a firm wants to reduce its workforce, it may dismiss some of its workers. Altematively, it may make workers eligible for disability benefits. Upon examination these workers formally satisfy the conditions for disability enrolment. Because these conditions allow for a rather liberal interpretation of disability, these workers could have stayed on their job had they not become redundant. We use data on Dutch firms to show that at the end of the 1980s about 10 percent of the observed inflow into disability were in fact dismissals.

Keywords: Dismissals; Disability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vua:wpaper:1995-36

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