Management Shareholding ain't all it's cracked up to be

William Taylor

No 375907, Competition & Regulation Times from New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation

Abstract: Stock- and option-based compensation is generally given to managers for the purpose of aligning their incentives with those of shareholders. But, as William Taylor points out, it may actually have the opposite effect: managers become over-exposed to their firm's fortunes and so make more conservative investment decisions than shareholders would like.

Date: 2007-07-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vuw:vuwcrt:375907

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