The efficiency of collusion and criminal sanctions in New Zealand

Lewis Evans

No 19146, Working Paper Series from Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation

Abstract: On January 27 the Justice Minister released a discussion document proposing to criminalise cartel activities such as price fixing and bid rigging. In this seminar Professor Evans will consider efficiency aspects of the Minister's proposal in particular the efficiencies which can arise when competing business cooperate and the difficulties officials can have in separting beneficial and harmful cooperation.

Keywords: price fixing; criminal sanctions; New Zealand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vuw:vuwcsr:19146

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