Private Selection and Arbitration Neutrality

Alon Klement

No 19178, Working Paper Series from Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation

Abstract: This seminar examines the effects that the private selection of arbitrators has over arbitrators' incentives in deciding the cases before them and over the arbitrators' implied bias. These effects have important implications for the design of Arbitration rules by Arbitration and Dispute Resolution providers as well as by other organisations that rely on arbitration for the resolution of disputes among their members. Professor Klement shows that private selection of arbitrators might adversely affect the accuracy of arbitrators' decisions because arbitrators might want to make a incorrect decision when a correct decision would carry the inference that they are biased. He compares the accuracy of arbitrators' decisions under different arbitrator selection procedures.

Keywords: arbitration; dispute resolution; selection procedures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/19178

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vuw:vuwcsr:19178

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation ISCR, PO Box 600, Victoria University Wellington 6140, New Zealand. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Library Technology Services ().