An AxiomaticAnalysisofIntervalShapleyValues

Shinichi Ishihara and Junnosuke Shino
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Shinichi Ishihara: Waseda Institute of Political Economy Waseda University

No 2214, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games in which players are assumed to face payoff uncertainty as represented by a closed interval. In this study, we examine two interval game versions of Shapley values (i.e., the interval Shapley value and the interval Shapley like value), and characterize them using an axiomatic approach. For the interval Shapley value, we show that the existing axiomatization can be generalized to a wider subclass of interval games called size monotonic games. For the interval Shapley-like value, we show that a standard axiomatization using Young’s strong monotonicity holds on the whole class of interval games.

Keywords: cooperative interval games; interval uncertainty; Shapley value; axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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