The Model of Clickbait: Fact-Checking and Endogenous Information Acquisition

Masayuki Odora ()
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Masayuki Odora: Global Education Center, Waseda University

No 2521, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: I study the role of fact-checking in a two-period strategic communication game between a decision maker and a media outlet. The decision maker relies on the outlet’s article to take a binary action, while the outlet may exert costly effort to acquire information before publishing. The decision maker is uncertain about the outlet’s motive: the outlet might be opportunistic, caring only about attracting clicks. Fact-checking probabilistically reveals the payoff-relevant state. I highlight a trade-off between the diagnostic effect and the discipline effect that arises when the probability of fact-checking successfully revealing the state increases. Consequently, introducing fact-checking or increasing its success probability may, in some parameter ranges, reduce the decision maker’s welfare.

Keywords: Fact-checking; Information acquisition; Cheap-talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2025-10
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