Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: The Dilemma of Consistency and Revision in Expert Communication

Yoshio Kamijo (), Daiki Kishishita () and Satoru Shimokawa ()
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Yoshio Kamijo: Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University
Daiki Kishishita: Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Satoru Shimokawa: Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University

No 2532, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: This paper identifies a fundamental expert communication dilemma: citizens distrust consistent advice as a signal of bias, yet distrust revision as indicating limited knowledge. We formalize this in a repeated cheap-talk model with bias uncertainty and gradually accumulating evidence. Theoretically, perfect compliance obtains without private information but collapses otherwise. Experiments reveal the dilemma is more severe than predicted, emerging even without private information. Importantly, private signals do not reduce welfare but instead filter incorrect advice. Finally, compliance substantially recovers with algorithmic advisors, suggesting automated advice mitigates communication failures in controversial policy environments.

Keywords: Reputational cheap talk; Expert advice; Informed receiver; Algorithmic advice; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
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