The Psychological Toll of Potential Strategic Interaction: Rule Design and Gender Differences in Competitive Performance

Shigeharu Okajima (), Yoshio Kamijo (), Tsuyoshi Nihonsugi () and Hiroko Okajima ()
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Shigeharu Okajima: Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University
Yoshio Kamijo: Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University
Tsuyoshi Nihonsugi: Department of Economics, Osaka University of Economics
Hiroko Okajima: Nagoya University Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University

No 2607, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: This study examines whether pre-competition uncertainty contributes to gender differences in competitive performance. Many workplace evaluations and promotions involve uncertainty regarding others' potential strategic actions prior to formal competition. Leveraging institutional variation in Japanese professional speedboat racing, we compare "quasi fixed-lane" races—where lane changes before the start are permitted by rule but not executed—with fixed-lane races, in which repositioning is strictly prohibited. This setting allows us to examine exposure to rule-based pre-competition uncertainty in the absence of realized strategic interaction. Gender performance gaps are observed only in environments characterized by such uncertainty. In mixed-sex quasi fixed-lane races, female performance declines while male performance improves; in contrast, these differences are substantially reduced in fixed-lane races, where such uncertainty is absent. The results are consistent with the interpretation that performance disparities partly reflect anticipatory psychological responses to the mere possibility of strategic interaction rather than realized strategic actions. These findings highlight the role of institutional design in shaping gender differences in competitive outcomes.

Keywords: Pre-competition uncertainty; gender differences; competitive performance; institutional design; strategic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2026-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gen and nep-spo
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