Wage Subsidies to Promote Female Hiring: Evidence from Pakistan

Maurizio Bussolo, Jean Nahrae Lee, Mahreen Mahmud, Nayantara Sarma and Anaise Williams

No 11317, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Can employer-side wage subsidies increase hiring women in low female labor force participation settings? This paper tests this using a randomized experiment with 1,227 Pakistani firms on a national jobs platform. Treatment firms were offered a six-month wage subsidy determined via the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism. They were 11 percentage points more likely to hire a woman, with larger effects for male-only firms. After 18 months, the treatment effect on employing a woman persisted, although the firm-wide share of female employees did not change. Additionally, administrative data show the treated firms reduced male-preference language in job postings, consistent with emerging demand-side shifts.

Date: 2026-02-23
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