Will GATT enforcement control antidumping?

Joseph Finger, K.C. Fung and Dec

No 1232, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The authors try to gauge why the GATT dispute settlement process has, to date, been so ineffective in disciplining the use of antidumping measures. Focusing on the five cases in which panels have completed their findings and recommendations, the authors identify the sources of this ineffectiveness and evaluate the likelihood that the process will become effective. Changing the bureaucratic momentum of the system is possible, they contend, but would not be easy. It would require greater resolve by member countries'GATT delegates to see that GATT rules are enforced - a greater willingness to stand up to domestic pressures to bend GATT rules to suit the demands of national politics. Changing the legal momentum of the system will be even more difficult, say the authors. Interpreting the GATT in a legalistic way compels one to interpret it as a statement of rights to impose antidumping duties. The substantive criteria for action are broad: the injury concept justifies protection for anyone to whom it is worth the time to ask for it. The constraints onantidumping actions - loopholes and procedural technicalities - are artificial, so legal reform means getting rid of them. Where do the GATT articles on trade remedies lead? The authors contend that if you take a legalistic view, you come to a protectionist conclusion.

Keywords: TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Globalization and Financial Integration; Environmental Economics&Policies; Transport and Trade Logistics; Common Carriers Industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-12-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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