Aid dependence reconsidered

Jean-Paul Azam (), Shantayanan Devarajan and O'Connell

No 2144, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: When foreign aid undermines institutional development aid recipients can exhibit the symptoms of aid "dependence" - benefiting from aid in the short term but damaged by it in the long term. The authors find that one equilibrium outcome can be high aid and weak institutions, even when donors and recipients fully anticipate aid's effects on institutional development, but don't take the drastic steps needed to put the country on the path to independence. Another equilibrium outcome can be low aid and strong institutions. Their model encompasses such diverse experiences as those of Tanzania and the Republic of Korea. When the development community ignores aid's effect on institutions, the outcome depends greatly on initial conditions. Where institutions are initially weak (as in many Sub-Saharan African countries at independence), institutional capacity collapses and foreign aid eventually finances the whole public budget. Where they are initially stronger, the result can be close to the institutions-sensitive equilibrium. The results suggest that, even for countries with similar per capita income, the foreign aid strategy should be designed to suit the country's institutional capacity. In some cases a short-term reduction in aid may increase a country's chances of graduating from aid.

Keywords: Economic Theory & Research; Development Economics & Aid Effectiveness; National Governance; Public Sector Economics; School Health; Gender and Development; Poverty Assessment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-07-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Working Paper: Aid dependence reconsidered (1999)
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