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Price and quality effects of VERs - revisited: a case study of Korean footwear exports

Jaime de Melo and L. Winters

No 216, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The application of index numbers to disaggregated Korean footwear exports during 1974-85 suggests that binding voluntary export restraints (VERs) led to significant price increases but not to the upgrading of quality predicted in earlier theoretical analyses. The results in this paper were derived from exporters rather than importers data. Drawing its comparisons from multilateral indices, the paper finds that the price of Korean footwear exports to the United States rose significantly in the years when the VERs were binding. VERs were associated less with quality upgrading and if anything were possibly associated with quality downgrading. The empirical results confirm that as a result of VER type restrictions on shoes, rents accrue to the exporting country, but shoes do not show the improved quality that automobiles do under similar restrictions.

Keywords: Access to Markets; Markets and Market Access; Economic Theory&Research; Transport and Trade Logistics; Common Carriers Industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989-06-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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