The unbalanced Ururguay Round outcome: the new areas in future WTO negotiations

Joseph Finger and Julio Nogues ()

No 2732, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The Uruguay Round involved a grand North-South bargain: The North reduced import barriers, particularly in textiles and agriculture. The South adopted new domestic regulations in such areas as services and intellectual property-changes that would lead to increased purchases from the North. In mercantilist economics, apples for apples-imports for imports. In real economics, apples for oranges. The authors argue that while the North's reduction of import barriers benefits both the North and the South, the new domestic regulations adopted by countries of the South could prove costly to those countries. To begin with, the regulations will be expensive to implement. And while the cost side of their impact is secured by a legal obligation (in the case of intellectual property rights, for example, the cost is higher prices for patented goods), the benefits side is not so secured.

Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Decentralization; Rules of Origin; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Trade and Regional Integration; World Trade Organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSC ... d/PDF/multi0page.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations (2005)
Journal Article: The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2732

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Roula I. Yazigi ().