 A framework for the analysis of mineral tax policy in sub-Saharan AfricaRobert F. Conrad and Zmarak M. Shalizi No 90, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank Abstract: Given the dual role played by the Government as resource owner and tax collector in many sub - Saharan economies, it is important to separate"resource factor payments"from taxes through the use of different instruments. The instruments to be considered are: (1) a factor payment system that includes"ad rem"or"ad valorem"royalties. Production sharing, resource rent schemes, and fixed fees could also be used, but some form of unit payment is necessary and justified, because natural resources in the ground are inputs into the production process; (2) a cash flow and withholding tax system initially for the mineral sectors and eventually for other sectors of the economy. The cash flow tax would capture a share of the"economic rent"from each sector and be neutral across sectors; and (3) a depletion account to preserve the nations capital stock. Natural resources are part of an economy's capital stock, which will fall unless"replacement investment"is made as the resource is depleted. Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; Banks&Banking Reform; Public Sector Economics&Finance; Health Economics&Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:90 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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