Costs of Negotiation and the Structure of Bargaining- A Note'

Eva Pichler ()

No 9, Department of Economics Working Paper Series from WU Vienna University of Economics and Business

Abstract: According to Horn and Wolinsky' s model on the patterns of unionization the workers' and the firm's interests with respect to the scope of unionization are always opposed to each other. Of course, transaction costs of bargaining can establish a region in which an encompassing union is more profitable for both parties. This note demonstrates that due to externalities of negotiations the range of this possibility is much lager than the difference of expected transaction costs.

Date: 1991-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://epub.wu.ac.at/6282/ original version (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden (https://epub.wu.ac.at/6282/ [308 PERMANENT REDIRECT]--> https://epub.wu.ac.at/id/eprint/6282 [302 FOUND]--> https://research.wu.ac.at/en/publications/cb4737e8-7e2a-46ff-a90f-8d2fa3d6e304)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wiw:wus005:6282

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics Working Paper Series from WU Vienna University of Economics and Business Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by WU Library ().