Bargaining and Exclusion With Multiple Buyers

Dilip Abreu and Mihai Manea

Econometrica, 2024, vol. 92, issue 2, 429-465

Abstract: A seller trades with q out of n buyers who have valuations a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ an > 0 via sequential bilateral bargaining. When q

Date: 2024
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